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1942] NOTES AND COMMENTS
LABOR LAW
CLASS SUITS FOR BACK WAGES
Alleging that under the wage terms of an arbitration agreement
3500 of its members were entitled to $370,000 in back pay,' the Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, Local No. 753, brought action in the
federal district court against the Associated Milk Dealers, Inc., an
organization composed of dairies. In sustaining the motion to dismiss
the complaint on the ground that such a suit in behalf of others- was
an improper class action, the court remarked that rights to back wages
were individual rights enforceable only by individual truck drivers.2
There is no question but that collective bargaining agreements
are enforceable. They are no longer mere gentlemen's agreements.3
It was less certain who may enforce them. The cases are numerous
in which collective contracts have been held enforceable against union
employees, 4 and there are many cases to support the proposition that
individual union employees may enforce wage schedules, 5 seniority
'After negotiations for a new collective contract had broken down in
the spring of 1940 for the second time, the union and the dairies
on July 15 submitted their dispute to an arbitration committee.
September 14 the arbitration committee awarded a new contract
setting the hourly wage of milk wagon drivers at 81 cents, the
new rate to be retroactive to June 1. The union asserted that
during the fifteen-week period between June 1 and September 14
their members had worked 68 hours a week for $48 (slightly more
than 70 cents an hour) and that they were entitled to the dif-
ference in back wages. The dairies objected to this interpretation
of the arbitration award, but the court, failing to discuss the
merits, decided the case upon the procedural point.
2 Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local No. 753 v. Associated
Milk Dealers, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
349 sTAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§151, 157 (1941 Supp.); N.L.R.B.
v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939); N.L.R.B. v. Electric
Vacuum Cleaner Co., 120 F. (2d) 611, 616 (C.C.A. 6th, 1941);
Christiansen v. Local 680 of Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees of
New Jersey, 126 N. J. Eq. 508, 10 A. (2d) 168 (1940), Harper
v. Local Union No. 520, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 48 S. W (2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). Contra:
Wilson v. Air Line Coal Co., 215 Iowa 855, 246 N.W. 753 (1933),
Kessell v. Great Northern Ry., 51 F (2d) 304 (W.D. Wash. 1931).,
4 Whiting Milk Companies v. Grondin, 282 Mass. 41, 184 N. E, 379'
(1933); Whiting Milk Companies v. O'Connell, 277 Mass. 570, 179
N. E. 169 (1931); Western-United Dairy v. Nash, 293 Ill. App.
162, 12 N. E. (2d) 47 (1937).
G McNeill v. Hacker, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 432 (1940), Wanhope v. Press
Co., 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 797 (1939); Dierschow v. West Suburban
Dairies, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 355 (1934), San Antonio and A.
P. Ry. v. Collins, 61 S.W. (2d) 84 (Tex. Comm. of App. 1933);
Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W (2d)
696 (1928), Blum & Co. v. Landau, 23 Ohio App. 426, 155
N. E. 154 (1926), ef Huston v. Washington Wood and Coal Co.,
103 P. (2d) 1095 (Wash. 1940), Gary v. Central of Georgia
Ry., 44 Ga. App. 120, 160 S.E. 716 (1931), Keysaw v. Dotter-
weich Brewing Co., 105 N.Y.S. 562 (1907).
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rights,G and wrongful discharge clauses7 established in such agreements.
In some cases non-union employees who have "ratified" the collective
contract have been permitted to recover back wages urder it.8
The cases are equally numerous in which the unions themselves
have been held to possess legal rights and duties under collective
agreements. As the collective bargaining process has become the ac-
cepted method of resolving labor disputes, the courts have permitted
unions, despite their voluntary and unincorporated character, to sue
and be sued.o Unions have, for example, enforced arbitration clauses,'0
closed-shop provisions, 11 and anti-lock-out agreements,1 2 and have had
agreements to arbitrate before striking enforced against them.'
3
In summary, collective bargaining agreements are enforceable by
or against individual members in matters affecting them specifically
and individually; and such agreements are enforceable by or against
the union in matters affecting all members or large classes of mem-
bers. These last-named rights may be referred to as collective-in
the sense that they are common to all members and that violation oper-
ates uniformly against all members.
14
6 San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co. v. Collins, 61 S.W. (2d) 84 (Tex. Comm.
of App. 1933). Cf. West v. Baltimore and 0. Ry., 103 W. Va.
417, 137 S.E. 654 (1927).
7 St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. v. Booker, 5 S.W. (2d) 856 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
8 Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Webb, 64 F. (2d) 902 (C.C.A. 5th, 1933);
Yazoo & M. V. Ry. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931).
9 Levy v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 104 P. (2d) 770
(Calif. 1940); Petition of Minasian, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 818 (1939);
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chi-
cago, No. 753, 371 Ill. 377, 21 N.E. (2d) 308 (19.39); Swing v.
A. F. of L., 372 Ill. 91 (1939); Kirkman v. Westchester, 24
N.Y.S. 909 (1935); Murphy v. Ralph, 299 N.Y.S. 271 (1937);
United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922);
Schlesinger v. Quinto, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (1922); Nederlandsch
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart Maatachapij v. Stevedores' and Long-
shoremen's Benevolent Society, 265 Fed. 397 (E.D. La. 1920);
Franklin Union No. 4 v. State of Illinois, 220 fI1. 355, 77 N.E.
176 (1906). Contra: St. Paul Typothetae v. St. Paul Bookbinders'
Union, No. 37, 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725 (1905).
1'Petition of Minasian, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 818 (1939).
"Goldman v. Cohen, 227 N.Y.S. 311 (1928); Harper v. Local Union
No. 520, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 48 S.W.
(2d) 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Jacobs v. Cohen, 183 N.Y. 207,
76 N.E. 5 (1905); Moeschi v. Mosteller, 28 F. Supp. 613 (1939).
12Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co., Inc. 292 N.Y.S. 898 (1936).
' 3Uneeda Credit Clothing Stores, Inc. v. Briskin, 14 N.Y.S. (2d) 964
(1939); Preble v. Architectural Iron Workers' Union of Chicago,
Local No. 63, 260 Ill. App. 435 (1931).
24 One consistent thread running through all the cases in which unions
have been permitted to enforce collective agreements is that they
have been equity actions for injunctions. On principle, however,
there is no reason why unions should be permitted to sue only in
cases where injunction is the proper remedy. For general lan-
guage implying that the union should be able to sue whenever a
right common to all the members is infringed, see Christiansen v.
Local 680 of Milk Drivers and Dairy Employees of New Jersey,
126 N. J. Eq. 508, 10 A. (2d) 168 (1940); Biller v. Egan, 290
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Individual employees may sue to collect damages suffered from
the violation of a collective agreement wage scale. But can the union,
acting in its own name and in behalf of all members similarly situated,
also enforce such wage rights? And if it can, upon what theory can
such a decision be supported? In the instant case, the court took the
position that such an action was impossible as a matter of "law"
unless it could be called a class suit and thus woven into the traditional
procedural pattern.15  Considered solely from the narrow view to
which the court limited itself, the issue is at least arguable. The
general rule with respect to class suits is that members of the same
class, having common rights, and whose joinder is highly impracticable,
may be represented in a class action in order to avoid a multiplicity
of litigation.- 6 The union, by bringing this action in behalf of 3500
milk drivers allegedly damaged under the agreement, represented em-
ployees with a common right in the agreement-namely, the obtaining
of wages due under it. 17 Hansberry v. Lee,18 upon which the court
relied to support its decision, is doubtful authority. In that case the
plaintiff, asserting that he represented 95 per cent of the property
owners in the area, sued to enforce a restrictive covenant in their
behalf. The court ruled that the suit was not a proper class action
because the plaintiff was representing people with diversified, not
common, interests, some of the property owners being interested in
enforcing the covenant and others being interested in defeating it.
In order to apply Hansberry v. Lee to instant case, the court must
take the position that some of the 3500 employees would object to
being awarded back wages.
Even conceding that the decision in the instant case represents
the "law," the case represents undesirable policy. One cannot escape
the conclusion that the court's decision is, in effect, a decision for the
dairy company on the merits, although it purports to be otherwise.
The court, while insisting that non-suiting the union is necessary in
Ill. App. 219, 8 N.E. (2d) 205 (1937) ;Carpenters' Union v. Citizens'
Committee to Enforce the Landis Award, 333 Ill. 225, 164 N.E. 393(1928). But see, Cole, The Civil Suability at Law of Labor Unions
(1939) 7 FORDHAM1 L. REv. 29.
IS Milk Wagon Drivers Union of Chicago, Local No. 753, v. Asso-
ciated Milk Dealers, Inc. 39 F. Supp. 671 (N.D. Ill. 1941).
16 48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 28 U.S.C.A. § 723c, Rule 23, (1941 Supp.) ; Mc-
Daniel v. Board of Public Instruction for Escambia County, 39
F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Fla. 1941); National Hairdresser's & Cos-
metologists' Ass'n v. Philad. Co., 34 F. Supp. 264 (D. Del.
1940); Atwood v. National Bank of Lima, 115 F. (2d) 861 (C.C.A.
6th, 1940); ILL. REV. STAT. (1941) c. 110 § 147; Weberpals v.
Jenny, 300 Ill. 145, 133 N.E. 62 (1921); Groves v. Farmers' State
Bank of Woodlawn, 368 Ill. 35 (1937); Leonard v. Bye, 361 Ill.
185, 197 N. E. 546 (1935); Greenburg v. City of Chicago, 256
Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 1039 (1912).
17 The practical difficulty of determining whether or not each of the
3500 employees had done the same amount of overtime work un-
doubtdly influenced the court in its decision. As a matter of
fact, however, the milk wagon drivers probably worked on a
uniform time schedule. If not, the information could easily have
been gleaned from the records of each dairy.
18 311 U.S. 32 (1940). But cf. 372 Ill. 369, 24 N. E. (2d) 37 (1940).
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order to protect the employees' rights, has quite effectively emas-
culated those rights; for it is understood that few, if any, of the
financially weak truck drivers will press their claims.19
Moreover, the economies to be gained from having one suit instead
of hundreds strengthen the argument. For legalists who worry about
how such actions may be worked into the scheme of the "law," it may
be said that at least one court has taken the step,201 and that the well-
accepted doctrine that a union may enforce "collective rights" might be
extended to cover such cases as the one in issue. Thus, a union would
be permitted to enforce individual wage rights accruing under a
collective bargaining contract, in cases where the rights were com-
mon to a large class and violated uniformly.
LABOR LAW
"LABOR DISPUTE" AND UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION:
A REPLY
This letter concerns the recent comment appearing m the Indiana
Law Journal of February, 1942 entitled "Labor Dispute and Unem-
ployment Compensation." To me this article is a fine example of
the present day tendency found in many law schools and some courts
to pervert sound legal reasoning into the legislative function of de-
termining public policy.
Your criticism of the opinion in Barnes v. Hall, 285 Ky. 160, 146
S.W (2d) 929, cert. dented 100 U.S.L. Week 3119, resolves itself into
a contention that the words "labor dispute" as used in the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act (which deprives employees of compensation
pending a labor dispute) should be given a different meaning from
the same words used in the Norris-LaGuardia Act (which limits the
granting of injunctive relief against employees in certain cases in-
volving labor disputes). To me to give these words different mean-
ings would make the court appear ridiculous. Obviously, an employee
cannot have his cake under the Norris-LaGuardia Act or the National
Labor Relations Act and still eat it under the Unemployment Com-
pensation Act.
One would think that where the words "labor dispute" had been used
by a legislative body in two prior acts (Norris-LaGuardia Act and
N.L.R.A.) and given a definite meaning therein, that when the same
words are placed in another act, without qualification, one could rely
upon the assumption that the Legislature was using the words with
a settled and fixed meaning. What right has the court to search
for a "public policy" to upset the meaning of words used by the Legis-
lature in such a case? These words were placed in the Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act by the Legislature for a purpose and the
only way to get rid of them is for the Legislature to do so.
19 For an excellent discussion of the administration of justice to the
highest bidder, see RODELL, WOE UNTO YOU LAWYERS (1939) 225 to
246.
2, Barth v. Addie, 271 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. (2d) 34 (1936) (court held
that an employee could collect wages due under a collective agree-
ment and that the union, acting in its own name, could intervene
in behalf of the other employees and collect their back wages).
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